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Special operations forces (SOF) are employed across the entire spectrum of 
conflict and serve as a strategic asset that cannot be built-up quickly or easily replaced 
when lost. Anticipating combat attrition to special operations forces is critical to 
USSOCOM in maintaining the proper force level to meet the expanding role of SOF in 
peacetime and in war. High resolution models such as Janus can be used as a tool to 
model and develop SOF attrition coefficients. Attrition coefficients developed from high 
resolution combat models can be used in aggregate combat models that resolve attrition 
using Lanchester equations. 
This thesis examines the combat attrition of U.S. Army special operations forces. 
It develops a methodology for modeling SOF in Janus and calculating SOF attrition 
coefficients from high resolution combat model simulation results for use in Lanchester 
models of warfare. Selected missions involving SOF at the Joint Readiness Training 
Center (JRTC) are examined and likely force-on-force engagements between SOF and 
enemy forces are modeled in Janus. The special operations missions examined in this 
study are a direct action and a special reconnaissance mission. 
The SOF scenarios modeled in this study are well suited for developing attrition 
coefficients using the MLE attrition coefficient technique. The scenarios modeled involve 
direct force-on-force engagements between special operations forces and enemy forces. 
The high resolution combat model used in this study produced a time series of casualties 
for each simulation replication. The short duration of the force-on-force engagements 
modeled make them ideal for producing MLE attrition coefficient estimates. Assessing 
the distribution pattern of MLEs provides added insight into the overall behavior of the 
attrition coefficient estimates. 
The casualty outcome trees developed for the scenarios capture the overall pattern 
of SOF attrition resulting from the high resolution model simulation replications. The 
attrition coefficient estimates developed in this study are conditional in nature and rely on 
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probabilistic outcomes to determine when they are to be used in Lanchester equations to 
assess casualties. Casualty outcome trees are simple in structure and could easily be 
incorporated into aggregate combat models to resolve SOF attrition. 
The diverse role of special operations forces in peacetime and in war makes it 
particularly difficult to predict all situations in which SOF casualties can occur in a 
conflict. Special operations forces are often employed in strategic economy of force 
operations where direct contact with enemy forces is unlikely. But, other SOF missions 
place soldiers in situations where direct contact with enemy forces is inherent or very 
probable. The direct action raid and special reconnaissance mission are clearly two 
situations in which force-on-force engagements with enemy forces are likely to occur. 
Larger scale operations like those conducted by ranger units are also well suited for 
modeling and developing attrition coefficients with high resolution models. 
However, attrition to special operations forces is not always a process that can be 
modeled using Lanchester models of warfare. Deployment of SOF onto the modern non-
linear battlefield will result in situations where massive casualties will be suffered by the 
force in a small instance of time. Examples of such situations are special operations (SO) 
aircraft that are shot down on infiltrationlexfiltration and SO detachments that are 
compromised and engaged by enemy aircraft or artillery. These situations produce 
multiple casualties at the same time and are ill-suited for portrayal with Lanchester 
models. They are also likely to be SOF's greatest casualty threat in future conflict. 
The attrition coefficients developed in this study are only as good as the high 
resolution model and the item level data input into the model. Accurately modeling 
special operation forces in a high resolution model is a difficult task. However, as high 
resolution models evolve, their ability to model special operations forces should continue 
to improve. Current efforts in modeling dismounted soldiers look promising and should 




The Joint Mission Analysis (JMA) is conducted by every component of the United 
States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The component JMA is compiled and 
analyzed at USSOCOM to detennine future force requirements for all special operations 
forces (SOF). Currently, attrition factors for SOF do not exist. Therefore, at the 
conclusion of a conflict or a battle, the special operations forces are assumed to be at one 
hundred percent strength. This results in underestimating the size of the force needed to 
fight two simultaneous, or near simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs). The U.S. 
Army calculated attrition factors for conventional forces based on Korean War and World 
War II data which are published in the Staff Officer's Guide PM 101-1-1/2. The 
Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) is considering conducting attrition analysis to update 
attrition factors for conventional forces, but has no plans to include SOF. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Special operations have proven to be an integral part of the combined arms team. 
When utilized properly they are invaluable assets to theater commanders throughout the 
entire spectrum of conflict. Many low resolution/aggregate combat models now 
incorporate the employment of special operations forces. Combat losses to special 
operations forces are unrealistic in the models because unique attrition factors for special 
operations (SO) are not adequately represented. A typical way of handling SOF attrition in 
low resolution models like TACWAR and Corps Battle Simulation (CBS) is as follows. 
Once a SOF unit is detected, it is attrited according to the model's standard light infantry 
attrition coefficients for aimed fire in the Lanchester calculations. In the Joint Theater 
Level Simulation (JTLS) model, SOF units are given a special attrition multiplier, applied 
when they are the killers in the Lanchester calculations [Ref 1]. This is an effort to 
account for the fact that SOF units are specially trained and generally more effective than 
conventional units. However, the standard light infantry attrition coefficients used to 
assess casualties against the SOF fail to capture many critical synergisms of special 
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operations forces and missions. As a result, the ability of aggregate models to accurately 
portray SOF attrition is limited. Current aggregate models provide USSOCOM with very 
little insight into realistic combat attrition of SOF units when evaluating war game results. 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Currently, attrition factors for Special Operations Forces do not exist. The intent 
of this thesis is develop a methodology for using a high resolution combat model to 
develop attrition factors for selected U.S. Army special operations missions. 
D. SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
1. Nature of Special Operations 
Special operations are actions conducted by specially organized, trained, and 
equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic or 
psychological objectives by nonconventional means in hostile, denied, or politically 
sensitive regions. Special operations missions are conducted during peace, conflict, and 
war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional forces. [Ref 2] 
2. U.S. Army Special Operations Forces 
U.S. Army special operation forces consist of Special Forces, Rangers, the Special 
Operations Aviation Regiment, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs forces. The 
largest Army SOF component comprises the five active-duty special forces groups 
(SFGs). The major role of the special forces is to conduct direct action (DA) , special 
reconnaissance (SR), unconventional warfare (UW), and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) 
missions in support of theater commanders. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A detailed literature review was conducted, with the aid of the USSOCOM 
historian, to assess the feasibility of collecting historical data. The primary sources 
examined included after action reports (AARs) and operations reports from special 
operations units operating during World War II (WWII) and from the Korean War 
through Desert Storm. The security classification of many sources had recently been 
reduced to secret making them easier to access for research. 
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The WWII sources examined consisted of the Jedburgh operations into Europe, 
Ranger operations during the Normandy invasion, 1st Special Service operations in Italy 
and Alamo Scout operations in the Southwest Pacific. Sources documenting special 
operations conducted during the Korean and Vietnam War were limited, and detailed 
documentation of combat losses were not available. After action reviews (AARs) from 
more recent conflicts to include Desert Storm were also examined. Overall, the sources 
examined lacked a detailed breakdown of individual SOF operations and combat losses. 
The following information was determined to be critical by the author and 
USSOCOM in evaluating SOF attrition: mission type, infiltration means, mission 
duration, number of personnel deployed on the mission, number of killed in action (KIA), 
number of wounded in action (WIA), environment and enemy activity in the area of 
operation. Less than fifty percent of this information was available in the documents 
examined. Due to the lack of detailed historical data, U.S. Army SOF attrition factors 
will be developed utilizing a high resolution combat model. 
F. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this thesis is to develop a methodology for modeling selected 
U.S. Army SO missions in a high resolution combat model and calculating attrition factors 
from simulation results. The thesis will demonstrate this methodology by modeling 
selected U. S. Army special operations missions in a high resolution combat model. 
Mission scenarios to be modeled will be SO missions that are currently conducted at the 
Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). An experiment will be designed to execute the 
mission scenarios. The data produced by the simulation runs will be analyzed and 
statistical techniques will be utilized to develop attrition factors. 
G. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This research is unique in that there has been no other attempt to develop attrition 
factors for special operations forces utilizing the results from a high resolution combat 
model. The methodology will develop a general framework for determining likely or 
probable situations in which SOF forces could be involved in force-on-force engagements 
with enemy forces. The attrition factors developed in this study are unique to the 
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scenarios and situations modeled. Numerous scenarios will need to be modeled and 
evaluated before a robust set of attrition factors can be developed for use in aggregate 
combat models. Current high resolution models were the greatest limitation to this study. 
Great care must be taken to insure that the capabilities of SOF are accurately portrayed in 
the high resolution model. However, as high resolution models continue to evolve, they 
will improve their ability to portray dismounted infantry and special operations forces. 
The model utilized in this study is Janus 4.0 which was selected because it is the current 
Anny high resolution model used for analysis. It is also in use at both the United States 
Anny Special Operations Command (USASOC) simulation center and the Joint Readiness 
Training Center. This study discusses some methods that can be utilized in Janus to better 
portray special operations forces. Finally, only two of the many missions conducted by 
SOF, direct action and special reconnaissance, were used for modeling purposes in this 
study. 
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ll. MODELING SOF IN JANUS 
A. GENERAL 
U.S. Army special forces missions are currently being modeled at the SOF 
Simulation Center at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina using Janus. The focus of the modeling 
effort at the SOF Simulation Center is operational planning to prepare units for upcoming 
deployments and JRTC rotations. Conventional mechanized and light infantry operations 
are modeled to assist in the preparation of special forces soldiers to conduct mobile 
training teams (MTTs) and foreign internal defense (FID) missions. However, detailed 
analysis of simulation results has not been conducted. 
Decision makers will only use the results of a model if they believe the model can 
accurately portray the soldiers and weapons involved in the scenario under representative 
terrain and environmental conditions. The first half of this chapter will focus on the 
suitability of Janus to model special forces operations. It will assess how well Janus 
represents the individual dismounted soldier's ability to shoot and move. The second half 
of the chapter will address the limitations of modeling special forces in high resolution 
models. Lastly, techniques utilized to account for some unique aspects of special 
operations forces and missions are discussed. 
B. SUITABILITY OF JANUS 
1. General Description 
Janus is the primary high resolution combat simulation model for brigade size and 
below operations approved by the U.S. Army. It can be used interactively or non-
interactively. Interactive play, using a man-in-the-Ioop, replicates realistic battlefield 
conditions because as the enemy's activity develops, reactive decisions can be made. 
However, adding a man-in-the-Ioop creates more variability and may introduce bias. 
Janus uses line of sight (LOS) algorithms and the U.S. Army's Night Vision and 
Electro-Optical Laboratories (NVEOL) model to detect targets. A target must be within 
LOS and weapon range for an engagement to occur. Engagement outcomes are 
stochastically determined based on probability of hit (Ph) and probability of kill (Pk) data. 
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Outcomes are binomial, either a suppression, which is a miss, or a kill. Suppression 
prevents the weapon system that is receiving fire from returning fire for a user specified 
length of time. When kills occur in Janus they are all catastrophic. The Ph and Pk data for 
the weapons used in the scenarios were unclassified data provided by TRAC. Parameters 
from other sources, such as technical and field manuals, were also utilized. Examples of 
these parameters are round velocity, basic load of ammunition, time required to reload the 
weapon, number of trigger pulls before reload, and number of rounds per trigger pull. A 
system can be as simple as a soldier with a semi-automatic weapon, or as complex as a 
platoon of tanks, each having multiple weapons. Each system is represented with a 
graphical symbol regardless of its complexity level. 
Terrain in Janus is normally one hundred meter resolution. However, Janus has 
the capability to utilize terrain with increased resolution. Elevation, vegetation, water, 
urban areas, and cultural features are represented by data from the Defense Mapping 
Agency (DMA) and Waterways Experimentation System (WES). The JRTC scenarios are 
modeled using the Ft. Polk terrain database which was recently updated. The vegetation, 
water, urban areas, and primary/secondary roads are very accurately represented. 
Movement rates of vehicles and soldiers are adjusted to account for the effects of differing 
terrain. Dense vegetation and steep slopes slow movement rates. Janus also uses 
meteorological data, which the detection algorithms incorporate to either enhance or 
hinder detection capabilities. Night representation has been added to Janus, which affects 
the detection capabilities of a system's sensors. The terrain, weather, day and night 
capabilities increase the realistic representation of the SOF mission scenarios. 
2. Individual Dismounted Soldier 
Each soldier can be individually modeled as a system in Janus. This provides the 
capability for each soldier's location and movement routes to be planned separately. Each 
soldier/system can be assigned the individual weapons that would be employed during the 
mission. Soldiers employing more than one weapon can be assigned ranges in which to 
use their primary and alternate weapons. Priorities of fire can be assigned so that soldiers 
will engage targets according to a designated precedence. Each soldier can also be 
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assigned primary and alternate sensors that are used to acquire targets. Ammunition basic 
loads, re-Ioad times and rounds per trigger pull can also be pre-designed. Modeling 
individual soldiers works well for small unit operations. However, movement planning 
and control becomes unwieldy for unit operations larger than platoon level. 
3. Movement 
Special forces soldiers use terrain features and vegetation to mask their movement 
in enemy territory. Movement of individual soldiers in Janus can be planned to take 
advantage of both terrain relief and vegetation. The line-of-sight (LOS) feature in Janus 
can be used to plan routes that minimize the chance of enemy detection around the target 
area. Routes are designated by using movement nodes. Movement nodes can be timed to 
assist in coordinating synchronized movement events, such as assaults. A sprint function 
is available which allows soldiers to move at maximum speed. However, soldiers moving 
in the sprint mode remain fully exposed during the duration of the movement. 
During movement Janus does not distinguish between a soldier crouching, high 
crawling or low crawling. This is not a problem if LOS does not exist between the soldier 
and enemy forces. However, if LOS exists the soldier is modeled as if he is fully exposed 
which increases the probability of detection. This can lead to abnormally high detection 
rates for special forces soldiers moving into overwatch or hide positions around a target. 
Techniques to counter this effect will be discussed in Part D. 
4. Shooting 
Soldiers can be given a pop-up status in Janus that places them in a defilade status 
when they are not moving. This effectively simulates a soldier stopping in a covered 
position which affords some protection from enemy observation and engagement. The 
soldier's sensors continue to scan its field of view for potential targets and will 
automatically move from a defilade status to a partial defilade status to engage targets. 
Soldiers can also be placed in hold fire status if they are not to engage detected enemy 
forces. 
Each soldier can be assigned an individual field of view which assigns a sector of 
responsibility to the soldier's sensors. If LOS exists and the target is detected it goes onto 
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the soldier's target list and is assigned a priority. The LOS feature can be used to check 
individual firing positions to insure that LOS exists and that the target area is within the 
soldier's primary weapons range. 
5. Night Operations 
Night operations can be modeled in Janus 4.0. A separate database must be 
constructed to accurately model night operations. The night database should include 
probability of hit tables that have been adjusted for night firing. Night sensors data for 
night scopes and night vision devices was obtained from TRAC Operations and Analysis 
Center, Data Development Division at Ft. Leavenworth, KS. The sensor data, in the form 
of Mean Resolvable Cycles (MRC) curves, is considered classified data and must be 
perturbed before it can be run on unsecured computing platforms. The:MRC curves for 
night sensors used in this study were perturbed slightly, using guidance from TRAC, to 
allow the study to be conducted on unsecure computing platforms. The:MRC curves are 
broken down into numerous illumination conditions. The night illumination condition 
utilized in this study is quarter moon illumination. 
C. LIMITATIONS 
High resolution models are continuously improving their ability to portray the 
modem battlefield. However, certain aspects of combat will never be accurately captured 
by mathematical models and simulations. Initial simulation runs revealed many of the 
limitations noted below. The following limitations area not unique to Janus, but are 
prevalent in most high resolution combat models. Techniques used to adjust for some of 
the more critical shortcomings are discussed in Part D. 
1. Battle Field Sound 
Special forces soldiers use stealth while moving to prevent detection. Targets are 
often detected by sound alone, particularly at night. Janus does not have a sound sensing 
algorithm to distinguish the different noise levels between a vehicle moving along a road 
or a soldier creeping through the woods. Improvements in this area are being studied and 
may be implemented in the future. 
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2. Element of Surprise 
Special forces operations are carefully planned and executed operations that often 
rely on the element of surprise to provide a distinct advantage during mission execution. 
It is difficult to account for the element of surprise in Janus. Enemy soldiers are assigned 
fields of view and continuously scan their sectors of responsibility. However, the field of 
view of soldiers can be manipulated to reflect a forces' level of alertness during a 
particular scenario. 
3. Training Levels 
Janus does not have an algorithm that distinguishes different training levels 
between opposing forces. Special forces soldiers are highly trained professional soldiers 
who are accustomed to operating independently behind enemy lines. They possess highly 
specialized skills and enhanced basic soldier skills that make them an extremely lethal 
force. Moreover, motivation and desire to succeed have been the hallmarks of the 
American soldier throughout history. These intrinsic qualities are difficult to captured in 
current combat models. 
4. Reconnaissance 
During special forces mission planning, intelligence assets often provide detailed 
assessments of the target area. Once special forces units arrive in the target area, a 
detailed ground reconnaissance is normally conducted to fix the location of the target and 
potential threats to the operation. Currently it is difficult for Janus and other high 
resolution combat models to portray the advantages afforded to a force that has detailed 
accurate intelligence prior to the conduct of a operation. Research is being conducted in 
this area and improvements may be made in the future. 
5. Human Factors 
Like most combat models, Janus does not have algorithms that can predict how 
humans will react in combat situations. Fatigue levels from continuous operations can 
often impair a soldier's judgment. Individual soldier loads can have a great impact on 
movement speeds and the duration of movement. A soldier's level of alertness is affected 
by stress, amount of sleep and numerous other factors. It continuously changes 
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throughout the course of a operation. Soldiers often become complacent when they are in 
what they perceive as safe areas while senses are often heightened during actual combat. 
D. SOF UNIQUE MODEL ADJUSTMENTS 
The following model parameter adjustments were determined to be important for a 
more accurate portrayal of special operation forces in Janus. Adjustments were based on 
operational experience and were determined to be reasonable by the USSOCOM 
simulation center. 
1. Movement 
Test simulation runs revealed that special forces soldiers moving into overwatch or 
hide positions around the target were detected by enemy forces at an unreasonably high 
rate. Soldiers moving into these positions normally crawl to minimize their chance of 
detection. The minimum detection dimension is equal to the smallest of the system's 
dimensions in meters. This parameter is used in the Janus detection algorithm to 
determine if a potential target is acquired. A standard dismounted soldier moving in a 
crouched position has a minimum detection dimension of 0.2 meters. For soldiers moving 
into overwatch or hide positions this parameter was iteratively reduced until they could 
successfully move into position undetected. The value of the minimum detection 
dimension was reduced to 0.1 meters (1/2 original value) to account for their movement 
posture around the objective area. This change resulted in detection rates that were 
clearly more realistic and allowed the SO forces to gain the element of surprise. 
2. Reconnaissance 
Ground reconnaissance by special forces prior to the execution of actions on the 
objective is conducted to locate the target and potential threats to the operation. 
Determining the location of all enemy forces on the target is a critical part of the 
reconnaissance. When supporting or overwatch elements move into position around the 
target, they will in effect have already detected the enemy forces. A plausible way to 
account for this in Janus is to increase the minimum detection dimension of enemy forces 
on the objective. The minimum detection dimension of enemy was iteratively increased 
until the SOF soldiers in supporting positions could acquire enemy soldiers on the 
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objective. The value of the minimum detection dimension was increased from 0.2 to 0.5 
meters to account for knowledge of the enemy's location gained through ground 
reconnaissance. 
3. Training Level 
Attempting to account for the superior training and lethality of special forces in 
Janus is a difficult task. Adjusting the probability of hit given shot (Phis) tables for 
weapons systems used in the scenario is a possible course of action. The Phis tables for 
friendly forces are based on the marksmanship skills of conventional U.S. soldiers. Threat 
forces Phis tables are for forces assumed to be at the same marksmanship level as Soviet 
military forces. 
Marksmanship skills possessed by special operations forces are clearly superior to 
those of conventional forces. However, an analysis to quantify the level of increase that 
is justified has not been conducted. This study will increase the Phis tables for SOF forces 
by ten percent which is likely to be a conservative estimate. This will help to reflect the 
increased lethality of SOF in the scenarios. Special operations forces are often employed 
against forces that may not be at same marksmanship skill level as Soviet forces. 
Adjustments up or down to enemy Phis tables may be justified depending on the presumed 
marksmanship skill level of the threat forces modeled in the scenario. These adjustments 
are very subjective in nature and should be made with great care. This study will make no 





The following methodology was used for calculating SOF attrition factors. The 
methodology uses the results from a high resolution combat model to calculate attrition 
coefficients for selected special operations missions. This study uses SO mission scenarios 
currently being conducted at JRTC. The structure of the methodology incorporates a 
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The methodology begins with the modeling of special operations forces as 
discussed in Chapter II. A scenario combat attrition analysis was then conducted to 
determine the force-on-force engagements between special forces units and enemy forces 
that are most likely to occur during the particular scenarios. The force-on-force 
engagements identified in the attrition analysis are then modeled in Janus. Finally, a 
statistical analysis is conducted and attrition coefficients are developed from the simulation 
results utilizing the maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) approach. The baseline threat 
in the scenarios is modeled after the opposing force (OPFOR) employed at JRTC. The 
number of enemy forces and illumination conditions is varied in the scenarios to provide 
robustness. 
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The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to examining the scenarios and 
forces modeled, conducting the scenario attrition analysis, describing the MLE attrition 
coefficient technique and outlining the experiment. 
B. SCENARIOS 
The scenarios modeled are special forces missions currently conducted at the Joint 
Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Ft. Polk Louisiana. JRTC is the premier training 
and evaluation center in the Army for light infantry and special operations forces. The role 
of JRTC is to prepare forces to conduct their wartime missions in a joint service 
environment. The overall scenario is geared toward contingency operations in a low 
intensity conflict. Typically, U.S. Army special forces units are deployed prior to 
hostilities into the mythical country of Cortina to conduct special reconnaissance, foreign 
internal defense, and direct action missions in support of the conventional forces 
commander. Operations are conducted just as they would happen in a real conflict, with 
a dedicated OPFOR that is modeled after a low intensity threat force. Observer 
controllers accompany all friendly units and provide detailed after action reviews upon the 
completion of operations. 
1. Special Forces Missions 
The primary missions conducted by Army special forces units are direct action, 
special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, 
psychological operations, counter terrorism, search and rescue, and humanitarian 
assistance operations. This study will model selected parts of direct action and special 
reconnaissance scenarios conducted during JRTC rotation 95-3. 
a. Direct Action 
Direct action (DA) operations are short-duration strike or other small-scale 
offensive actions by SOF to seize, destroy, or inflict damage on a specific target or to 
destroy, capture, or recover designated personnel or property. Direct action operations 
include raids or ambushes, seizure of key facilities, interdiction of major lines of 
communication, recovery of sensitive items of equipment, abduction of selected enemy 
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personnel, liberation of captured personnel, support of deception operations, and show-of-
force operations [Ref 3]. 
The direct action mission modeled in this study involves a raid on a key 
enemy communications site to recover a critical component of a radar system. The 
component is a digital data down-link/up-link cipher control module that enhances the 
enemies ability to coordinate air-defense assets. The control module has not been placed 
into operation yet, and represents an significant threat to U.S. aircraft after employment. 
The target is believed to be occupied by a small armed force and two technical advisors. 
The mission is to recover the cipher control module and destroy any remaining equipment. 
h. Special Reconnaissance 
Special reconnaissance (SR) is an activity conducted by SOF to obtain or 
verify information concerning enemy activity and/or secure data of meteorological, 
hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of an area. This is accomplished by using 
small teams, with specialized communications equipment, that have a minimal chance of 
detection, to collect and report information in support of essential elements of information 
and other intelligence requirements [Ref 3]. Special reconnaissance missions conducted 
at JRTC include the observation of key enemy resupply caches, avenues of approach and 
other named areas of interest (NAI). 
2. Friendly Forces 
The U.S. Army special forces unit modeled in the scenarios is the Special Forces 
Operational Detachment (SFOD). The SFOD consists of two officers and ten enlisted 
soldiers. The soldiers on the detachment are highly trained in their specialty MOS and 
receive cross-training in all critical detachment skills. Below is an organizational diagram 
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Figure 3-2. SFOD Organizational Diagram 
SFODs can deploy into the operational area by air, land or sea. They are capable 
of moving over rugged terrain in any weather conditions, day or night. Their small size 
and capability of conducting operations in a stealthy manner makes SFODs difficult to 
detect and defend against. The table below displays the standard individual weapons and 
sensors that were used to modeled the SFOD in the Janus simulations. The SFOD's 
weapons remain fixed in all the scenarios modeled. The weapons and sensors were 
modeled from information obtained in the Army Special Forces Data Reference Guide. 
Position Weapons Day Sensors Night Sensors 
Detachment Commander M16/9mm eyes/binos ANIPVS-7 ANIPVS-5 
Detachment Technician M16/9mm eyes/binos ANIPVS-7 ANIPVS-5 
Operations Sergeant M16/9mm eyes/binos ANIPVS-7 ANIPVS-5 
Intelligence Sergeant M16/9mm eyes/binos ANIPVS-7 ANIPVS-5 
Weapons Sergeant M60/9mm eyes/binos ANIPVS-7 ANIPVS-5 
Assistant Weapon Sgt M203/9mm eyes/binos ANIPVS-7 ANIPVS-5 
Medical Sergeant M16/9mm eyes/binos ANIPVS-7 ANIPVS-5 
Commo Sergeant M16/9mm eyes/binos ANIPVS-7 ANIPVS-5 
Engineer Sergeant M249/9mm eyes/binos ANIPVS-7 ANIPVS-5 
Assistant Engineer Sgt M203/9mm eyes/binos ANIPVS-7 ANIPVS-5 
Table 3-1. SFOD Weapons and Sensors 
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3. Enemy Forces 
Enemy forces portrayed in the scenarios are the People's Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Atlantica. The enemy force is modeled after a third world military force that is 
flexing its muscles in an attempt to intimidate a country with close ties to the United 
States. The enemy's posture was determined from SOF Combat Instructions 95-3 [Ref 
8]. The instructions outline the number of enemy personnel on the targets and their 
behavior. The enemy forces located on targets are lightly armed and only strong enough 
to provide limited local security. They do not actively patrol around the targets and are 
thought to maintain a platoon size reaction force that can respond to most areas within 
thirty minutes. The enemy soldiers in the scenarios modeled have the weapons and 
sensors displayed in the table below. 
Table 3-2. Enemy Weapons and Sensors 
This study also develops attrition factors using variations to the baseline enemy 
force by altering the enemy force size. 
C. SCENARIO COMBAT ATTRITION ANALYSIS 
Combat attrition analysis of a scenario is done to determine probable or likely 
situations that could result in force-on-force engagements between the SFOD and enemy 
forces. This is a subjective evaluation that examines the scenarios and determines the 
most probable situations in which the SFOD could incur combat casualties. Attrition 
analysis cannot predict all the situations in which a SFOD could come into contact with 
enemy forces. However, a careful examination of the scenario, focusing on the terrain and 
enemy activity, can provide insight into the most probable situations in which SFOD and 
enemy encounters could occur. This section will first break down a typical SFOD mission 
into phases to give the reader a better understanding of the overall structure of a SO 
mission. Each scenario was then examined to determine the force-on-force engagements 
to be modeled in Janus. JRTC observer controllers (OCs) were interviewed and provided 
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critical insight for the selection of probable force-on-force engagements. Their experience 
proved invaluable in determining the situations modeled in this study. 
1. Mission Phases 
Following is a breakdown of a SFOD mission into its major phases. Most SO 
missions conducted into denied areas can be broken down into these three major phases. 
a. Infiltration Phase 
Infiltration consists of the initial phase of the operation to insert the special 
operations forces into the denied area. Special operations aircraft, normally employed to 
insert the SFODs, are specially designed to penetrate enemy air space undetected. SFODs 
can conduct infiltration into denied areas by air, land, or sea. 
h. Mission Duration 
Mission duration can normally be broken down into additional sub-phases 
of the operation. These generally consist of movement in a denied area, to and from the 
target or objective, and actions on the objective. Listed below are the sub-phases of 
mission duration in a denied area. 
• Movement to the target area: The movement from the point of infiltration to 
the target. 
• Actions on the objective: Actions conducted on or in the vicinity of the target. 
Normally the most important phase of the mission and the phase where special 
operations forces are most vulnerable to combat losses. 
• Movement to the extraction point: Movement from the target area to the 
location were the force is to be extracted. 
c. Exfiltration Phase 
Exfiltration consists of the final phase of the operation, utilized to extract 
the special operations forces from the denied area. Exfiltration is also conducted by air, 
land, or sea. 
The operational phases provide the general framework for the attrition analysis. 
The results of the attrition analysis and key assumptions used in modeling the engagements 
are discussed below. 
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2. Direct Action Mission 
The attrition analysis conducted on the direct action mission to seize the cipher 
control module resulted in two likely situations involving force-on-force engagements to 
be modeled in Janus. The situations involve the actual actions on the objective phase of 
the operation and possibility of chance contact with the enemy. 
a. Actions on the Objective 
Clearly, the SFOD must actually send forces onto the objective to seize the 
cipher control module. This places the SFOD in direct contact with enemy forces on the 
target during the actions on the operation phase. 
b. Chance Contact 
The SFOD could be detected during any phase of the operation. Detection 
would likely result in enemy contact. The most probable situation that results from the 
detection of the SFOD by enemy forces is chance contact. Chance contact may result in 
an engagement with enemy forces in which the SFOD will immediately attempt to break 
contact and move to a safe area or extraction point. After successfully breaking contact, 
the commander will then determine whether or not to continue the mission, based on the 
degree of compromise. Detection often results in an aggressive attempt by enemy forces 
to find and capture the SFOD. Having lost the element of surprise, the SFOD will likely be 
forced to abort the mission. 
3. Special Reconnaissance 
The nature of a SR mission made the attrition analysis quite simple. The object of 
SR is to remain undetected throughout all phases of the operation to gather and report the 
information required of the mission. Since there is no planned contact with enemy forces 
during the actions on the objective phase, the only situation that could result in attrition to 
the SFOD is chance contact. 
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4. Assumptions 
The following assumptions highlight some of the results from the attrition analysis 
and conversations with observer controllers at JRTC. The assumptions also simplify the 
modeling of the force-on-force engagements in Janus. 
a. Infiltration and Exfiltration 
The enemy forces in the scenario do not currently have a significant air 
defense network that can threaten low flying special operations aircraft. Therefore, 
situations involving attrition during the infiltration and exfiltration phases of the operation 
will not be modeled in this study. 
h. Reinforcements 
The reaction force in the scenario can reinforce the objective area in 
approximately thirty minutes. However, the SFOD's ability to strike quickly will enable it 
to conduct the operation and leave the objective before it can be reinforced by a reaction 
force. This assumption was confinned by OCs and by initial scenario test runs in Janus. 
The actions on the objective phase modeled for the direct action scenario will not allow 
for the reinforcement of enemy forces during the simulation. 
c. Chance Contact 
The terrain and vegetation at JRTC provide excellent cover and concealment 
for SFODs during all phases of movement. The SFODs can nonnally plan routes to and 
from the objective that take advantage of both the terrain, and vegetation, to minimize the 
chance of detection by enemy forces. The enemy forces in the scenario do not have the 
time or resources to conduct aggressive patrolling operations. When enemy patrolling is 
conducted, it is restricted to major roads and trails. Thus, chance contact between a 
SFOD and the enemy is only likely to occur when the SFOD negotiates a major danger 
area in route to, or in return from the objective. Danger areas are defined as major roads 
or open areas adjacent to trails or roads. Danger areas can often be bypassed during 
movement, however situations do occur were a SFOD must negotiate danger areas. 
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D. MAXIMUM-LIKELffiOOD ESTIMATES OF ATTRITION COEFFICIENTS 
1. General 
The attrition coefficients produced by the simulation results in this study are 
situation dependent attrition coefficients. They can be utilized in aggregate models that 
use situation dependent attrition coefficients in Lanchester equations to resolve attrition. 
The attrition coefficients developed in this study are limited to the situations identified and 
modeled in this study. However, follow on work in this area may provide a richer set of 
situationally dependent attrition factors for special forces operations. 
The attrition factors specifically apply to the Lanchester equations for aimed fire. 
The Lanchester attrition model for aimed fire defines the change in a force's size during a 
battle, with respect to time, as a function of the attrition coefficient multiplied by the size 
of the opposing force. The Lanchester attrition model for aimed fire, in mathematical 







The maximum-likelihood estimation approach produces estimates of a and b, based 
on the situations modeled, which can used in Lanchester equations. 
2. Maximum Likelihood Estimate Formula 
The maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) approach was utilized to calculate the 
force-on-force engagement attrition coefficients from the simulation results. The MLE 
approach is a fitted parameter model which takes a time series of casualty times and 
computes the maximum-likelihood estimate of the mean time between casualties. In 
developing the MLE approach, the battle casualties for the two opposing forces are 
treated as a continuous-time Markov-chains, and as a result the casualty streams are 
merely two superimposed POISSON processes. The MLE approach develops statistical 
estimates of the attrition coefficients, denoted as a and b, which are also maximum-
likelihood estimators of the POISSON parameter. The MLE model captures many of the 
synergistic effects involved in the combat simulation such as fire and maneuver and the 
complementary effects of various weapon mixes. The model assumes that a Lanchester 
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process is occurring and incorporates all assumptions that are implicit in the particular 
high resolution combat model being utilized. The attrition coefficient estimates is a 
function of the total casualties suffered by the particular force, x or y, divided by the 
summation of the total enemy firing minutes. The following fonnula are used to calculate 
the attrition coefficient estimates. [Ref 4] 
" c
y 




c; = the total casualties to side X 
q: = the total casualties to side Y 
tk = time until the occurance of the kth casualty 
mk = size of the X force after the kth casualty 
nk = size of the Y force after the kth casualty 
k = 1,2, .. ,K 
Dimensional analysis of the above attrition estimators indicates that : 
total X casualties 
a =-------------
total enemy firer time units against X 
Examining the dimensionally of the Lanchester Square Law attrition coefficient : 
number of X casualties 
a = --:----=---:----:----:---(Y firers) x (time) 
(2) 
Comparing the two it is easy to see that the MLE is a true estimate for the 
Lanchester attrition coefficient [Ref 5]. The Coroner's Report in Janus provides a 
detailed record of casualty times for each simulation run. The fonnulas above are easily 
incorporated into a spreadsheet to simplify attrition factor calculations. 
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E. EXPERIMENT 
The experiment is designed to provided insight into how various critical factors 
influence the combat attrition suffered by the SFOD. Janus provides the ability to assess 
scenarios under numerous conditions and parameter variations. Examples of such 
variables are tactical plans, terrain, weapon mixes, enemy force size, and other battlefield 
conditions. Clearly the enemy strength will have a direct impact on the attrition suffered 
by the SFOD during a force-on-force engagement. Varying the enemy force size can 
provide valuable insight into the range of attrition suffered by SO forces facing different 
enemy strengths. Technology advantages such as night vision devices and night sights can 
also have an impact on the outcome of a engagements and the combat attrition suffered by 
opposing forces. The number of parameters and conditions varied in this study will be 
limited largely by time. For the purpose of this study, one tactical plan will be developed 
for each force-on-force engagement modeled. The tactical plans are executed under day 
and night illumination conditions against different enemy force sizes. The conduct of each 
force-on-force engagement is detailed below. 
1. Direct Action Scenario 
The DA scenario was planned by three special forces officers, each having had a 
minimum of eighteen months as a SFOD commander. The officers were given a tutorial 
on using Janus to familiarize them with the model's basic functions and characteristics. 
They were then given a brief scenario description, mission statement, the target location 
and the suspected enemy strength. A ground ,reconnaissance of the objective was 
conducted using the LOS feature in Janus. The officers then developed the tactical plan 
for the actions on the objective, to include SFOD organization, movement routes, and 
weapons locations. 
The SFOD was organized into support and assault elements. The SFOD 
approached the objective utilizing a draw to conceal their movement (see Appendix A). 
The support element established two positions, one to the north and the other to the east 
of the objective. The support element, armed with an M60 machine-gun, a squad 
automatic weapon (SAW) and an M203 grenade launcher, established positions providing 
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LOS and supporting fire on the objective. Support positions also isolated the objective by 
covering the major avenues of approach into the radar site. The assault force, consisting 
of seven soldiers, approached the objective from the northeast wood line. The support 
force provided covering fire while the assault force moved across the objective to the 
west road on the objective. Once the assault force reached the limit of advance, the west 
road, the simulation was terminated. 
The tactical plan was then executed under both day and night illumination 
conditions, against four different enemy threat packages. The enemy threat packages for 
the DA scenario vary the enemy force size from the baseline of three soldiers, to six, 
twelve and twenty-four enemy soldiers, respectively. The enemy forces were deployed in 
static positions in a perimeter around the radar site in all scenarios. 
The DA scenario simulation plan includes one tactical plan, four enemy threat 
packages and day/night illumination conditions. This results in eight different scenario 
combinations. Each of the eight scenarios was further replicated twenty times varying the 
random number seed to change the probabilistic nature of the models results. 
2. Chance Contact Scenario 
The chance contact scenario models a break in contact between the SFOD and the 
enemy force. The SFOD is crossing a danger area (large open area) and an unknown 
enemy force is patrolling in the area. The SFOD establishes overwatch positions and 
moves across the open area. While negotiating the danger area a meeting engagement 
occurs with the enemy force in which a break in contact ensues (see Appendix A). For the 
purpose of this study chance contact can result in one of two different break in contact 
situations. If enemy forces detect the SFOD while exposed in the open area the SFOD 
will utilize a standard battle drill used by ranger patrols and special forces detachments to 
break contact [Ref 6]. Once under fire, the SFOD will use successive bounds, with one 
element always providing suppressive fires to cover the moving element, to break contact 
with the enemy force. The enemy force will conduct similar movement techniques as it 
attempts to close on the SFOD. Once the SFOD successfully moves back into the wood 
line and is no longer exposed to enemy fire the simulation is terminated. However, if the 
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SFOD detects the enemy force first it will attempt to avoid contact and move into the 
cover of the wood line. 
The break in contact will be modeled under day and night illumination conditions 
against four enemy force packages. The enemy force strength is varied from a baseline 
force of three, six, twelve and twenty-four enemy respectively. The conduct of the chance 
contact scenario includes one tactical plan, four threat packages, under day and night 
illumination conditions. This also results in eight separate scenario combinations. Again, 





The overall focus of this analysis is to develop situation dependent SOF attrition 
coefficient estimates from the Janus simulation results. The analysis first examines the 
overall casualty trends from the force-on-force engagements modeled. Casualty trends 
provide insight into how to best model the force-on-force engagements and calculate the 
attrition coefficient MLEs. After examining the casualty trends, attrition coefficient MLEs 
are calculated for all scenario replications. When possible attrition coefficient estimates fit 
to theoretical probability distributions capture the general behavior of the attrition 
coefficient estimates. Finally, a casualty outcome tree is developed for each force-on-
force engagement. Casualty outcome trees provide a model for assessing SFon casualties 
utilizing Lanchester equations and the attrition coefficient estimates developed in this 
study. While this study develops some attrition coefficients for the enemy forces modeled 
in the scenarios, the focus of the analysis is the combat attrition to the special forces 
detachment. 
B. CASUALTY TRENDS 
Basic casualty trends for the force-on-force engagements can be observed by 
examining boxplots of casualties suffered by the special forces detachment (SFOD) in each 
of the scenarios modeled. The boxplots provide a quick impression of certain prominent 
features of the casualty distributions [Ref 10]. SFOD casualties are examined with 
respect to changes in the enemy force size and illumination conditions. Casualty 
comparisons are also made between the direct action and the break contact force-on-force 
engagement. 
1. Enemy Force Size 
a. Direct Action Raid force-on-force engagement 
The boxplots for the direct action raid clearly show an increase in SFOD 
casualties as the size of the enemy force size on the objective increases for both the day 
and night scenarios. The detachment's average number of casualties during the day 
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scenario increases from .35 to .5, 1.9, and 7 respectively. The median number of 
casualties, the center or location of the distribution, is zero against three and six enemy 
forces. The median number of casualties increases to two and seven against twelve and 
twenty-four enemy forces respectively (see Figure 4-1). There are outside values, 
observations falling beyond the adjacent values, in the casualty distribution against three, 
six and twelve enemy. These values are revealed in the plots because the majority of the 
simulation replications against these enemy force sizes resulted in little to no SFOD 
casualties. The largest increase in detachment casualties clearly occurs when the enemy 
force size increases from twelve to twenty-four soldiers. 
Direct Action Raid ( Day) 
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Figure 4-1. Direct Action Raid Casualties (Day) 
The SFOD suffered zero casualties for all replications of the night raid 
against six enemy forces on the objective, so it is assumed that the detachment would 
suffer zero attrition during a night raid against three enemy. The detachment's average 
number of casualties during the night scenario increases from 0 to .35, and 2.15 
respectively. The median number of casualties, is zero against six and twelve enemy and 
increases to two against twenty-four enemy. There are no outside values in the casualty 
distribution against six enemy while three appear when the enemy force size increases to 
twelve (see Figure 4-2). 
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Figure 4-2. Direct Action Raid Casualties (Night) 
For both day and night scenarios the interquartiIe range (IQR), which displays 
the spread of the middle half of the casualties, also increases as the enemy force size 
increases on the objective. This increased spread in the casualty distribution is very 
apparent in the boxplots of SFOD casualties against twenty-four enemy. These boxplots 
are also more normally distributed than the other boxplots. 
a. Break Contact 
The distribution of casualties suffered during the break contact force-on-
force engagement demonstrates similar trends to those discussed above. The average 
number of casualties increases from .15, to .75, 3.55 and 4.15 respectively. The SFOD 
casualty IQR increases as the enemy force size on the objective increases from three to 
twelve soldiers. The SFOD casualty IQR then reduces its spread against twenty-four 
enemy. Again, the outside values in the boxplot of casualties against three enemy appear 
because all but two replications resulted in zero SFOD casualties. The largest increase in 
detachment casualties clearly occurs when the enemy force size increases from six to 
twelve soldiers. The distribution of casualties also appear to be distributed more normally 
as the enemy force size increases (see Figure 4-3). 
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Figure 4-3. Break Contact Casualties (Day) 
All night break contact scenario replications resulted in zero attrition to the 
SFOD. The detachment was able to detect the enemy with the aid of the night vision 
devices and successfully move back into the woodline prior to detection by enemy forces. 
With no night vision capabilities, the enemy had little chance of detecting and engaging the 
detachment. 
2. Dlumination Conditions 
The boxplots of the day and night raid clearly reveal a reduction in detachment 
casualties during night versus day force-on-force engagements (see Figures 4-1 and 4-2). 
As expected, a force with night vision capabilities has a distinct advantage over a force 
lacking this capability. Special operations forces can greatly reduce their chance of 
casualties by exploiting this advantage and conducting operations during periods of limited 
visibility. 
3. Direct Action versus Break Contact 
There is no apparent difference in the number of SFOD casualties suffered in the 
direct action versus the break contact force-on-force engagement against three and six 
enemy. However, there is a noticeable difference in the SFOD casualty boxplots against 
twelve and twenty-four enemy (see Figures 4-1 and 4-3). The SFOD casualties during the 
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raid remain low against twelve enemy and sharply increase against twenty-four enemy 
while the break contact casualties increase in a more linear fashion. 
The SFOD casualties during the raid scenario are greatly influenced by the number 
of enemy forces surviving prior to the assault force moving across the objective. As the 
enemy force surviving prior to the assault increases, the number of SFOD casualties also 
increase. The majority of enemy forces are destroyed prior to the assault against three, 
six, and twelve enemy resulting in low attrition to the SFOD. However, a sizable enemy 
force survives prior to the assault in the raid against twenty-four enemy resulting in a 
sharp increase in SFOD casualties. 
During the break contact scenario the SFOD is generally more exposed to enemy 
fire throughout the duration of the force-on-force engagement. However, the SFOD is 
able to maintain a relatively fixed distance between itself and the enemy forces as it moves 
back into the woodline. This results in a nearly steady increase in the SFOD casualties 
during the break contact force-on-force engagement. 
C. CASUALTIES AS A FUNCTION OF TIME 
In order to calculate accurate MLE's for the attrition coefficients, it is important to 
examine the behavior of battle casualties with respect to time. To capture casualty trends 
with respect to time, the casualty times for the replicated scenarios were aggregated, 
sorted in ascending order and cumulatively plotted as a function of casualty times. Initial 
calculations of MLEs of attrition coefficients revealed that force-on-force engagements 
with linear casualty plots produced fairly accurate attrition coefficient estimates while 
force-on-force engagements with nonlinear casualty plots produced less precise estimates. 
This discovery revealed a need to break some force-on-force engagements into phases to 
increase the accuracy of the attrition coefficient estimates. General casualty trends with 
respect to the raid and break contact scenarios are discussed below. 
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1. Direct Action Raid 
The casualty versus time plot for the day raid force-on-force engagement, 
displayed below in Figure 4-4, shows a rapid increase in enemy casualties with very few 
casualties suffered by the detachment during the first thirteen minutes of the engagement. 
However, after this point in time the casualty rate for the SFOD increases while the 
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Figure 4-4. Day Raid Casualty versus Time Plot (6 Enemy) 
It is easy to see that partitioning this engagement at thirteen minutes produces four 
near linear casualty versus time plots. The need to partition this battle is also easily 
explained in a tactical sense. During the initial phase of the engagement a heavy volume of 
fire from the detachment's support positions steadily attrits the enemy forces. Detachment 
members are generally concealed and less exposed to enemy fire during this phase of the 
engagement. During the second phase, the assault element closes and sweeps across the 
objective. Enemy forces surviving the initial phase now become a hazard to the exposed 
assaulting forces. For the purpose of this study, phase I of the raid, the support phase, 
will be the force-on-force engagement prior to thirteen minutes and phase II, the assault 
phase, will refer to the remainder of the engagement. 
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The trend, displayed in the graph, is consistent for most day direct action scenarios. The 
most noticeable deviation is seen in the casualty versus time plot for twenty-four enemy 
(see Figure 4-5). This plot reveals a steady increase in detachment casualties during both 
phases of the engagement. However, the most noticeable change is the drastic increase in 
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Figure 4-5. Day Raid Casualty versus Time Plot (24 Enemy) 
This is due to the increased number of enemy who survive the first phase of the 
raid and remain on the objective during assault phase. 
The night raid scenarios casualty versus time plot results in a fairly linear casualty 
trend for both the SFOD and the enemy forces (see Figure 4-6). This is likely a result of 
the fact that all weapons are less accurate under night firing conditions. The support 
elements, which proved to be extremely lethal during the day assault, lose some of their 
accuracy. However, the lethality of the assault force is greatly increased. As the assault 
force closes on the objective it is able to acquire and engage enemy forces prior to being 
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Figure 4-6. Night Raid Casualty versus Time Plot 
The increased effectiveness of the SFOD in phase II becomes more evident as the 
enemy force size on the objective increases. See the night raid casualty versus time plot 
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III Enemy cas. 
Figure 4-7. Night Raid Casualty versus Time Plot 
The enemy casualties clearly increase in the assault or second phase of the 
engagement causing a nonlinear enemy cumulative casualty plot. However, the 
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detachment's cumulative casualty plot remains fairly linear, and there is no need to 
partition the night raid engagement into phases to produce accurate attrition coefficient 
estimates. 
2. Break Contact 
The casualty versus time plot for the day break contact shows a fairly linear 
cumulative casualty plot for both forces in all scenarios (see Figure 4-8). Since both 
forces are primarily exposed during the engagement, casualties seem to occur at a 
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Figure 4-8. Day Break Contact Casualty versus Time Plot 
The most noticeable departure from this trend is seen in the casualty versus time 
plot against twenty-four enemy (see Figure 4-9). A larger initial enemy force size results 
in a larger enemy force that survives and closes on the detachment withdrawing into the 
woodline. As the enemy force closes it is subject to increasingly accurate fire from the 
detachment's overwatch positions, causing the noticeable increase in enemy casualties 
after fifteen minutes into the engagement. Again, the detachment's cumulative casualty 
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Figure 4-9. Day Break Contact Casualty versus Time Plot 
D. MLE ATTRITION COEFFICIENTS CALCULATIONS 
1. General 
Maximum likelihood estimates of attrition coefficient were calculated for each 
force-on-force scenario simulation replication. The time series of casualties from each 
Janus simulation replication was input into a spread sheet. The time series of casualties for 
each replication was sorted in ascending order and the attrition coefficient MLEs were 
calculated using equation (2). 
2. MLE Accuracy 
The accuracy of each simulation replication's attrition coefficient MLE was 
checked by using the Lanchester equation for aimed fire. This was accomplished by 
substituting the MLEs and the replication's simulation time into the Lanchester equation, 
equation (1), and calculating the predicted number of casualties to each side. The results 
were then compared to the actual simulation casualties to check the accuracy of the 
predicted results. 
Initial MLE calculations for the direct action raid provided accurate casualty 
predictions for the enemy but over estimated the SFOD casualties. Utilizing the insight 
gained through the casualty versus time plot the engagement was partitioned into two 
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phases which greatly improved the accuracy of the MLEs. The accuracy of attrition 
coefficient MLEs clearly improve as the time interval it is calculated over decreases. 
However, partitioning the force-on-force engagement into many small time intervals 
greatly increases the effort of calculating MLEs and also increases the complexity of 
casualty decision trees. The goal of this study is to calculate SFOD attrition coefficient 
MLEs that predict casualties within approximately one casualty of the simulation result. 
3. MLE Probability Distributions 
Attrition coefficient MLEs were fit to theoretical probability distributions in an 
effort to capture the overall behavior of the parameters. Knowing the attrition coefficient 
estimate's probability distribution enables the standard Lanchester equations to capture 
some of the stochastic nature of the high resolution model results. If desired, this can be 
accomplished by treating the attrition coefficient as a random variable in the Lanchester 
equation. Due to the limited samples taken in this study fitting attrition coefficient MLEs 
to theoretical probability distributions was not possible for all the scenarios modeled. 
However, probability distributions were fit to scenarios that contained more than seven 
non-zero attrition coefficient estimates. If the scenario failed to yield seven non-zero 
attrition coefficients estimates, the average values were utilized as the parameters in the 
casualty outcome trees. All mean and standard deviation calculations displayed in the 
tables utilize the non-zero observations. This results in parameter calculations that are 
conditioned on the fact that casualties have occurred. The Anderson-Darling normality 
test [Ref 9] was utilized to determine if the normal distribution was appropriate for the 
attrition coefficient estimates sampled. The null hypothesis of the test is that the attrition 
coefficient estimates are normally distributed. The test was performed at a significance 
level of 0.05. Thus if the attrition coefficient estimates' p-value is strictly less than 0.05 
the null hypothesis is rejected. 
Only one attrition coefficient MLE was determined to be an outlier. This attrition 
coefficient estimate was calculated for phase I of the day raid against twenty-four enemy. 
Examining the normal probability plot, Figure 4-10 below, the outlier of 0.024 is clearly 
37 
revealed. The remainder of the observations appear to be fairly symmetric and tightly 
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Figure 4-10. Direct Action Raid Normal Probability Plot (24 Enemy) 
Examining the results of the raid replication that produced this MLE revealed that 
the detachment suffered an unprecedented six casualties during phase I of the simulation. 
The highest number of casualties suffered during phase I of the remaining nineteen 
replications was three with an average number of casualties of 1.42. The extremely high 
number of casualties suffered during phase I of this replication is clearly an unlikely event 
and was removed from the probability plot. The samples were plotted again without the 
outlier, see Figure 4-11, and they clearly become more symmetric and normally 
distributed. The p-value for the Anderson-Darling normality test increases from 0.001, a 
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Figure 4-11. Direct Action Raid Normal Probability Plot (24 Enemy) 
The majority of the Anderson-Darling normality tests for the attrition coefficient 
estimate samples failed to reject the null hypothesis. However, some of the p-values were 
close to the significance level. After studying the data, the author feels that this is 
primarily due to the relatively small sizes of the samples tested in this study. Larger sample 
would likely produce higher p-values, resulting in increased confidence that the 
distributions are nearly normal. Samples for which the null hypothesis was rejected were 
fit to the Wiebull distribution. The Wiebull distribution has a shape and scale parameter 
that enables it to better fit probability distributions that are not symmetric in the tails. The 
graphs of all Anderson-Darling normality tests can be found in Appendix C. 
E. SFOD CASUALTY OUTCOME TREES 
The purpose of developing casualty outcome trees is to provide a model for 
incorporating the attrition coefficients developed in this study into aggregate combat 
models that resolves combat casualties using Lanchester equations. General casualty 
outcome trees are developed for both the direct action raid and the break contact force-
on-force engagements. Tables for each scenario outline the specific parameters portrayed 
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in the casualty outcome trees. Tables also display the p-value for all Anderson-Darling 
normality tests. 
1. General Casualty Outcome Tree Structure 
All casualty outcome trees begin with a binomial outcome which determine if the 
special forces detachment suffered casualties during the force-on-force engagement. 
Binomial outcomes are represented on the casualty outcome tree by circles. The 
probability of kill, Pk , represents the probability that the engagement results in a casualty 
to the detachment. The value of Pk was calculated by dividing the number of simulation 
replications that resulted in a casualty to the detachment by the total number of simulation 
replications. In the simple casualty outcome tree, if the binomial outcome results in a 
success then casualties are assessed against the detachment utilizing the attrition 
coefficient developed for that particular scenario. If the binomial outcome is a failure then 
no casualties are assessed against the detachment. Casualty assessment is represented on 
the tree with a diamond and is accomplished utilizing the Lanchester equation for aimed 
fire. Instructions on casualty assessment vary with the structure of the casualty outcome 
tree and will be explained below. Force-on-force engagements that are divided into 
phases result in more complex casualty outcome trees that utilize conditional probabilities 
to determine casualty results. 
2. Direct Action Raid 
The direct action raid resulted in two different casualty outcome trees, one for day 
and one for night illumination conditions. The day direct action raid casualty tree has one 
binomial and one probabilistic outcome. The first circle, labeled K in Figure 4-12, 
determines if the engagement results in casualties to the detachment. The second circle, a 
conditional multinomial outcome labeled P, determines which phases of the raid result in 
casualties. Given that casualties occur, it determines if casualties are to be assessed during 
only phase I, during only phase II or during both phase I and phase II of the raid. 
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Direct Action Raid 
Casualty Outcome Tree 
Assess casualties: 
Phase I only 
Phase II Only 
Phase I and Phase II 
No Casualties 
Figure 4-12. Day Raid Casualty Outcome Tree 
The parameters depicted on the casualty outcome tree are defined as follows. PI 
is the conditional probability that given the raid results in casualties, the casualties occur 
only in phase 1. Pn is the conditional probability that given the raid results in casualties, 
the casualties occur only in phase II. PWI is the conditional probability that given the raid 
results in casualties, the casualties occur in both phase I and phase ll. The parameter 
values for all casualty outcome trees were determined directly from the Janus simulation 
results. 
The casualty tree depicts four possible results. The multinomial outcome will 
determine which result leaf on the tree will be utilized to assess SFOD casualties. Given 
that the outcome results in leaf 1 or 2 the parameters located in Table 4-1 can be 
substituted into the Lanchester equation to determine the losses to the SFOD. This results 
in a straight forward calculation utilizing the .attrition coefficient, enemy force size and the 
mean engagement time. If the multinomial outcome result in leaf 3, enemy casualties must 
also be assessed during phase I of the engagement so that the reduced enemy force size 
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can be used in the phase II Lanchester calculation. Failure to adjust the enemy force level 
after phase I is equivalent to reconstituting the enemy force to full strength prior to the 
assault phase. This can be accomplished by subtracting the average number of casualties 
inflicted to the enemy force during phase I of the engagement from the starting enemy 
force size prior to calculating the SFOD losses for phase II. Both phase I and phase II 
SFOD casualty calculations are determined using equation (1). 
The parameters values for the day raid scenario casualty tree are shown below in 
Table 4-1. This table and the remaining tables in this chapter provide the necessary data 
needed to use the casualty outcome trees and equation (1) to assess SFOn casualties. The 
table below displays the probabilities for both the binomial and multinomial events on the 
casualty outcome tree and the theoretical probability distribution used to describe the 
dispersion of the scenario's attrition coefficient estimates. The enemy force size and other 
parameters needed to assess SFOD casualties with equation (1) are also provided. They 
include the scenario attrition coefficient estimate mean (a) and the average time in 
minutes of the force-on-force engagement (dt) by phase. Additional information provided 
are the attrition coefficient estimate standard deviation and the p-value of all Anderson-
Darling normality tests. The Wiebull distribution shape and scale parameters are provided 
for scenarios with p-values less than 0.05. 
Enemy PI< Phase PI Pn Plnn Attrition Mean Standard dt P-Value 
Force Coefficient Deviation 
Size Distribution a 
3 3/20 Phase I 0 N/A .031729 0 10.49481 N/A 
Phase II 2/3 113 N/A .069159 .000391 14.49964 N/A 
6 1/4 Phase I 0 N/A .018501 0 9.78333 N/A 
Phase II 4/5 115 N/A .099424 .041146 16.35 N/A 
12 4/5 Phase I 0 Normal .0104583 .0011618 9.8333 .432 
Phase II 9/16 7/16 Normal .0452738 .0219127 19.5748 .281 
24 1 Phase I 0 Nonnal .0067913 .0024533 10.3618 .239 
Phase II 1110 9/10 Nonna1 .0247799 .0102755 12.2108 .118 
Table 4-1. Day Raid Casualty Outcome Tree Parameters 
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The night direct action raid casualty tree has only one binomial outcome prior to 
determining the number of detachment casualties to assess (see Figure 4-13). Since the 
engagement was not partitioned into phases, the only probabilistic event is to determine, 
using Pk , if casualties are to be assessed against the detachment. 
Night Raid 
Casualty Outcome Tree 
Assess casualties 
No Casualties 
Figure 4-13. Night Raid Casualty Outcome Tree 
Given that casualties are to be assessed, the parameters in Table 4-2 can be used in 
the Lanchester equation to determine the number of SFOD casualties. 
Enemy Pk Attrition Mean Standard dt P-Value 
Force Size Coefficient a Deviation Distribution 
3 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
6 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
12 114 N/A .007069 .002353 25.72333 N/A 
24 4/5 Wiebull .004332 .003032 32.16458 N/A 
Shape: Scale: 
l.600146 .0048741 
Table 4-2. Night Raid Casualty Outcome Tree Parameters 
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3. Break Contact 
The break contact casualty outcome tree has the same structure as the night raid 
casualty outcome tree depicted in Figure 4-13 above. Since the break contact force-on-
force engagement was not partitioned into phases it requires only a binomial outcome to 
determine if casualties are to be assessed. Given that binomial outcome determines that 
casualties are to be assessed, the parameters in Table 4-3 can be used in the Lanchester 
equation to determine the number of SFOD casualties. 
Enemy Pk Attrition Mean Standard dt P-Value 
Force Size Coefficient Deviation 
Distribution a 
3 1/10 N/A .019914 .OU294 30.32 N/A 
6 U120 Wiebull .OU663 .006345 24.58 .02 
Shape: Scale: 
2.07762 .00132589 
12 1 Nonnal .0084685 .002867 27.48 .124 
24 1 Nonnal .0080383 .0016541 25.81 .642 
Table 4-3. Break Contact Raid Casualty Outcome Tree Parameters 
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v. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Special operations forces are employed across the entire spectrum of conflict and 
serve as a strategic asset that cannot be built-up quickly or easily replaced when lost. 
Anticipating combat attrition to special operations forces is critical to USSOCOM in 
maintaining the proper force level to meet the expanding role of SOF in peacetime and in 
war. High resolution models such as Janus can be used as a tool to model and develop 
SOF attrition coefficients. Attrition coefficients developed from high resolution combat 
models can be used in aggregate combat models that resolve attrition using Lanchester 
equations. 
The SOF scenarios modeled in this study are well suited for developing attrition 
coefficients using the MLE attrition coefficient technique. The scenarios modeled involve 
direct force-on-force engagements between special operations forces and enemy forces. 
The high resolution combat model used in this study produced a time series of casualties 
for each simulation replication. The short duration of the force-on-force engagements 
modeled make them ideal for producing MLE attrition coefficient estimates. Assessing 
the distribution pattern of MLEs provides added insight into the overall behavior of the 
attrition coefficient estimates. 
The casualty outcome trees developed for the scenarios capture the overall pattern 
of SOF attrition resulting from the high resolution model simulation replications. The 
attrition coefficient estimates developed in this study are conditional in nature and rely on 
binomial and probabilistic outcomes to determine when they are to be used in Lanchester 
equations to assess casualties. Casualty outcome trees are simple in structure and could 
easily be incorporated into aggregate combat models to resolve SOF attrition. 
The diverse role of special operations forces in peacetime and in war makes it 
particularly difficult to predict all situations in which SOF casualties can occur in a 
conflict. Special operations forces are often employed in strategic economy of force 
operations where direct contact with enemy forces is unlikely. While, other SOF missions 
place soldiers in situations where direct contact with enemy forces is inherent or very 
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probable. The direct action raid and special reconnaissance mission are clearly two 
situations in which force-on-force engagements with enemy forces may occur. Larger 
scale operations like those conducted by ranger units are also well suited for modeling and 
developing attrition coefficients with high resolution models. 
However, attrition to special operations forces is not always a process that can be 
modeled using Lanchester models of warfare. Employment of SOF onto the modern non-
linear battlefield will result in situations where massive casualties will be suffered to the 
force in a small instance of time. Examples of such situations are SO aircraft that are 
shoot down on infiltrationlexfiltration or SO detachments that are compromised and 
engaged by enemy aircraft or artillery. These situations produce multiple casualties at the 
same time and are ill-suited for portrayal with Lanchester models. They are also likely to 
be SOF's greatest casualty threat in future conflict. 
The attrition coefficients developed in this study are only as good as the high 
resolution model and the item level data input into the model. Accurately modeling 
special operation forces in a high resolution model is a difficult task. However, as high 
resolution models evolve, their ability to model special operations forces should continue 
to improve. Current efforts in modeling dismounted soldiers look promising and should 
enhance the efforts offuture studies. 
B. RECO~NDATIONS 
The following recommendations are made for future studies involving modeling 
and developing attrition factors for special operations forces. 
A study needs to be conducted to quantify the difference in marksmanship skills 
between a conventional soldier and a SOF soldier. This will ensure an accurate 
adjustment of the Phis tables in high resolution models to better represent the lethality of 
special operations forces. This study used a ten percent increase which is likely to be a 
conservative estimate. 
Future studies could provide additional insight into SOF attrition by varying 
additional model parameters in the scenarios. Variations could be made to the size of the 
special operations force and the its weapons. Enemy forces in the scenarios could be 
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refined with different weapons and night vision capabilities. Future SOF weapons could 
be tested in scenarios to see if they enhance the survivability of SO forces when compared 
to current weapons. Scenarios could also be modeled in various terrain and illumination 
conditions. 
Developing and maintaining a robust library of SOF attrition coefficients will 
require an extensive high resolution modeling effort by USSOCOM. Attrition coefficients 
could be developed for particular major regional conflicts and contingency operations. 
However, the attrition coefficients would need to be periodically updated as SOF and 
enemy capabilities changed. The resources and effort to accomplish this would be quite 
extensive. Finally, in the absence of detailed historical data on SOF attrition, USSOCOM 
should maintain a database of casualties suffered by SO forces conducting training 
operations at JRTC. This would provide the command with a rough idea of casualties 
suffered to special operations forces in a low intensity conflict. It could also be used to 




APPENDIX A. JANUS SENARIOS 
The figures in this appendix graphically depict the direct action raid and break 
contact scenarios as represented on the Janus screen. The threat force and the SFOD 
were placed on the same screen so that the reader can see the initial array of forces on the 
Fort Polk terrain. 
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Figure A-I. Direct Action Raid Scenario 
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Figure A-2. Break Contact Scenario 
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APPENDIX B. CASUALTY VS. TIME PLOTS 
The following plots are the remaining casualty versus time plots for the direct 

































Casualties versus Time 
(Day Raid 3 Enemy) 
20 30 
time (minutes) 
Figure B-1. Day Raid (3 Enemy) 
time (minutes) 




III Enemy cas. 
.SFODcas. 
III Enemy cas. 
250 




























1/1 ~ 10 
0 
0 10 
Casualties versus Time 




Figure B-3. Night Raid (12 Enemy) 
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Figure B-4. Break Contact (3 Enemy) 
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Figure B-5. Break Contact (12 Enemy) 
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APPENDIX C. RESULTS OF ANDERSON-DARLING NORMALITY TESTS 
The graphs of all remaining probability plots and Anderson-Darling normality tests 
are contained in this appendix. The plots were conducted on all attrition coefficient 
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Figure C-9. Break Contact (Day - 24 Enemy) 
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